THE BANGSAMORO Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is poised to enter a new chapter in its history with its upcoming parliamentary elections—a watershed milestone in the region’s push for self-determination. However, the recent and controversial exclusion of the Sulu province from the region raises a new set of political and administrative concerns.

As the young democracy gears up for its first election in May 2025, the sudden split of a key territory threatens to undermine the unity and the success of the region’s long-standing peace agreement with the Philippine central government.

Regional experiment, national repercussions

The Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) is the Philippines’ first successful attempt at establishing a self-governing entity with distinct powers in Muslim Mindanao. Known as Republic Act 11054, the landmark legislation was signed into law in 2018, aiming to ease tensions between the national government and rebel groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The Bangsamoro political structure differs from that of the national government and other Philippine constituent territories. Instead of a presidential system, Bangsamoro operates under a parliamentary framework, with the Chief Minister at the helm of the executive branch, accountable to a legislative body.

In this system, 40 of the total 80 seats are awarded to political parties based on their vote share. Meanwhile, 32 members are elected from population-determined districts, and eight seats are reserved for sectoral representation. Such a system favors party strength, making it a stronger force in Bangsamoro than in the rest of the Philippine political arena.

Moreover, the Bangsamoro Electoral Code establishes specific electoral restrictions absent from national election regulations. Notably, the election law bars political parties from submitting nominees with direct familial ties to incumbent representatives. Additional regulations also prevent candidates from leaving their political party within six months of the election to reduce political turncoatism.

As of October 2, COMELEC has accredited three regional parties for the parliamentary election: the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, the Al-Ittihad Mindanawe Darussalam–Ungaya Ku Kawagibu Bangsamoro (Al-Ittihad-UKB) Party, and the BARMM Grand Coalition.

The United Bangsamoro Justice Party, led by Murad Ebrahim—who also serves as the interim Chief Minister of Bangsamoro—is the political arm of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Meanwhile, the Al-Ittihad-UKB Party is led by former Technical Education and Skills Development Authority Director and four-time Sultan Kudarat governor Suharto Mangudadatu.

On the other hand, The BARMM Grand Coalition is an alliance of parties that lack the accreditation to run independently. However, the constitutional eligibility of the coalition’s leadership, under incumbent Sulu Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan, remains unclear.

The effects of the resulting parliamentary elections extend beyond Muslim Mindanao. Politicians from clan-dominated provinces frequently act as intermediaries, mobilizing popular support for national campaigns in exchange for local or regional autonomy and patronage from the executive government.

On the political precipice

The MILF has run the Bangsamoro interim government since its transition to greater autonomy under the 2019 Bangsamoro Organic Law. With Sulu no longer a part of Bangsamoro, the rival Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)—a concentrated force in Sulu—suffered a split in political legitimacy. The withdrawal increased tensions within the region, with Muslim authorities expressing fear that the political state of Bangsamoro may be subject to a power vacuum.

Recently, BOL’s ratification was passed despite a majority “No” vote from Sulu, with an 80% turnout rate, as the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi voted to ratify the law in an overwhelming majority. Here, plebiscite rules pitted Sulu’s votes as a comparative minority against the rest of ARMM, which was recognized at the time as one geographical region.

The plebiscite only asked voters whether they were in favor of the Organic Law, without explicitly asking whether or not they wanted to join the resulting Bangsamoro. This distinction ultimately formed the grounds for Sulu’s eventual withdrawal from the region.

Following the plebiscite results, Governor Tan filed a petition in 2018 before the Supreme Court, declaring Sulu’s automatic inclusion in BARMM unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petition to exclude Sulu from the young BARMM in 2024—a move that has since been criticized by local politicians in the region.

Former BARMM interior minister Naguib Sinarimbo lamented that “the consequence of [the exclusion] will be the death of the Bangsamoro idea,” an idea he described as a unifying identity for Muslims that have historically stood against colonialism.

Tan was the 2025 parliamentary elections’ top challenger for the executive leadership of BARMM, the Chief Minister, which is currently held by Murad Ebrahim of the MILF. When asked about his thoughts on the matter, Tan stated, “Kunwari lang ‘yan [ang chief minister], sila nga ang may gusto na matanggal na ang Sulu. Masaya nga sila kasi hindi ko sila matatalo.”

(They are just pretending–they are the ones that want Sulu to be excluded. They’re happy because I won’t be able to beat them. [The chief minister] was almost, inshallah, certain.)

Challenges ahead

Behind this dispute over Sulu’s exclusion are the national repercussions that would follow such a separation. Politicians from the national government have cited administrative issues arising from Sulu’s exclusion.

Senate majority leader Francis Tolentino advised that a transition fund would have to be created for every government agency and department operating in Sulu, as the separation from BARMM would disrupt services in the region.

Similarly, former BARMM interior minister Naguib Sinarimbo highlighted that following the Bangsamoro exit, “some very practical consequences” of the separation on the employment, projects, and operations in the ministries of Sulu would arise.

The split had also revitalized tensions with the MILF as the current central political player in the region. The political stability of the front is hinged on their ability to coordinate with local clans that hold nearly absolute power over their respective bailiwicks.

As such, tensions between parties as initiated by Sulu’s exit may weaken the confidence of the population in the future of the new region, potentially leading into instability or, at worst, a resurgence of armed conflict.

Historically, Southern Philippine political culture is deeply rooted in kinship ties and elite familial rule, where community relationships can escalate into wide-scale political violence.

While clans and the MILF remain heavily entrenched in BARMM politics, the upcoming elections are predicted to give way for smaller, alternative political parties to direct legislation efforts toward interests beyond ethnicities and clans—creating spaces and opportunities for further democratization.

Ultimately, the pursuit of peace in Muslim Mindanao has been long and hard-fought. The 2025 parliamentary elections present an opportunity for true stability and development in the region, offering the potential for true democracy to emerge from the historical grievances and cultural differences that have plagued its citizens for far too long.