INITIALLY CREATED to empower underrepresented parts of the country, the Philippine Party-list System (PLS) has deviated from its original purpose.

In 2019, election watchdog Kontra Daya found that almost 50% of accredited party-lists were linked to political clans, business tycoons, or other government and military offices. Some of these party-lists also had “unknown or unclear advocacies and representations.”

During the 2022 elections, this number ballooned to almost 70%. As the influence of political clans and vested interests in party-list politics continued to increase unchecked, a closer look into the PLS as an electoral institution remains imperative.

A house of cards

With the passage of the Party-List System Act of 1995, the Philippine public was finally able to select the party-lists that would serve in the government. Comprising 20% of the House of Representatives, party-lists were granted seats proportional to the amount of votes they garnered during the elections. These groups had to gain at least 2% of the total number of votes to achieve a place in Congress, and additional seats were awarded to party-lists who exceeded the minimum.

However, party-list seats are capped at a maximum of three, rendering no difference between one that obtained 20% of the vote and another that only garnered 10%. Such was the case during the 2001 general election, in which party-lists Bayan Muna and the Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives each gained three seats despite obtaining 26.19% and 12.29% of the vote, respectively.

In the first four election cycles following the PLS’s implementation, three party-lists garnered enough votes that would have granted them more seats if not for the three-seat cap. In the last five election cycles, however, there has only been one instance of such, as party-lists are not incentivized to grow their voter base due to the cap.

Consequently, party-lists initially cemented in advocacies gradually fragmented into smaller groups over time. Ateneo de Manila University Development Studies Instructor Erron C. Medina, MA stated that this development has favored politicians themselves rather than the sectors they represent.

According to Medina, politicians representing similar ideologies can run under different party-lists to eventually form a bloc in the Lower House for more voting power. As such, politicians are capable of obtaining more House seats in separate party-lists than if they were to operate as one organization.

Moreover, the increased number of party-lists, regardless of how similar their advocacies or ideologies are, results in longer electoral ballots. This discourages voters from checking the legitimacy of the hundreds of accredited party-lists, since they can ultimately only vote for one.

To avoid having to share votes with other opponents, some party-lists platform on personality rather than ideology. This practice has allowed personality-based politics to seep its way through the party-list system, with organizations such as 1-Pacman, Agimat ng Masa, and Duterte Youth capitalizing on the popularity of their namesakes.

Robinhood reversed

In 2013, 52 groups and organizations filed 54 petitions against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for a resolution denying them registration under the PLS. Among the grounds for denial included the groups’ and nominees’ failure to represent marginalized sectors of society, conflicting political agenda, and the groups’ failure to prove their track record in public service. 

In a 10-2-1 vote, the Supreme Court eventually ruled in favor of new parameters for qualification under the PLS, stating that it is “not limited to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,” reversing a 2001 Supreme Court interpretation. 

Following this decision, an increasing number of party-list representatives have been indicted in corruption scandals, including the notorious pork barrel scam, which defrauded the Philippine government of an estimated Php 10-billion.

Currently, the wealthiest Philippine lawmaker, Michael Romero of the 1-Pacman party-list, has a declared net worth of Php 7.8 billion as of 2018. The 1-Pacman party-list, or the One Patriotic Coalition of Marginalized Nationals, has pledged to advocate for no specific marginalized and displaced sector, rather pushing for general laws tackling poverty and education.

The 2013 ruling also allowed national, regional, and ideological parties to participate in party-list elections. Political parties being allowed to enter the race for the PLS have also resulted in the creation of organizations that exist solely to increase the power of certain politicians. One example is the Duterte Youth, a group that has stated that they support all of Duterte’s policies and would have defended the former president against any plots that aimed to oust him.

The party was criticized for weaponizing the youth sector to line the pockets of administration-aligned politicians as well as boost their voter base. Moreover, the party’s aims were in blatant violation of the checks and balances that should exist among the three branches of government, as the executive and legislative branches should remain independent and free of influence from each other. 

Structural revamp

Currently, several reforms are being proposed in the government and the academe. For example, both Senators Imee Marcos and Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa are introducing PLS reforms in the accreditation of party-lists. These proposals include extending COMELEC’s verification period, in which they will check the track records of party-lists to see if their objectives are truly legitimate.

On the other hand, some scholars call for more robust reforms such as the abolition of the three-seat cap in hopes of shifting the system to a “real” proportional one. Scholars are also suggesting raising the 2% threshold to build stronger parties. If this threshold is raised, party-lists will be incentivized to campaign and attract a larger voter base nationwide. Such a change would thus reduce duplicates in advocacies or ideologies, thus lessening the amount of party-lists that voters have to parse through on the ballot.

Lastly, a possible institutional reform not only for the PLS but for political parties in general is for the state to allocate funds for them. This reform would ensure the separation of private and public interests, as well as preserve the independence of government branches from one another.

Medina cited the example of the state funding of political parties in Mexico, where private donations are still allowed, yet it cannot exceed the funding given by the state. This mechanism ensures that political parties remain accountable to public scrutiny, even without first winning a seat. “Yes, we [have to] spend more, but if [we] want good institutions, we must pay for it,” he added.

Given the scale of the electoral reforms needed, however, more study in the Philippine context is vital. Medina argued that for these institutional reforms to be effective, they should result in the “sweet spot”—or the right electoral formula—that will help the country find the “right” politicians for the “right” representation.

Institutions are made with the intention to shape incentives and behavior, yet the governing laws of the Philippine PLS grant incentives for representative democracy only in name. Without clear limits on the individuals and organizations that represent the Philippine people, these institutions will only highlight the inability of the country’s political system to function in favor of the citizens who need it the most.