Shortly after the US President Barack Obama concluded his trip to Asia (April 23-29), where he visited leading allies to reinforce Washington’s strategic footprint in the region, China upped the ante by dispatching HYSY981—China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s state-of-the-art oil rig—deep into Vietnam’s 200-nautical-miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The $1-billion oil rig was reportedly accompanied by an armada of Chinese para-military vessels, which soon engaged in a dangerous naval standoff with Vietnamese maritime forces, raising the possibility of an armed confrontation.
Meanwhile, the Philippines released photos suggesting Chinese construction activities on the disputed Johnson South Reef in the Spratly chain of islands, which falls well within the Philippines’ EEZ. In response, the Chinese foreign ministry tried to justify the move by claiming it was “normal” for Beijing to proceed with construction activities in areas where it exercises “inherent and indisputable” sovereignty.
As a signatory to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), China is well aware that claimant states are obliged to refrain from, among other things, any form of coercive action to unilaterally alter the status quo in the disputed areas. Ironically, China tried to justify its earlier siege on the Philippine marine detachment in the Second Thomas Shoal by invoking the principles of DoC, (falsely) arguing that Manila was fortifying its presence in the disputed feature.
Through its latest actions, China has sought to hit multiple birds with one stone. On the one hand, China reaffirmed its commitment to defend its territorial claims in adjacent waters, openly defying Obama’s call for a peaceful, rule-based resolution of the ongoing maritime disputes. With the rise of popular nationalism in China, the authorities in Beijing have chosen an increasingly assertive position vis-à-vis territorial claims in the Western Pacific to enhance their domestic political legitimacy. As China struggles with a slowing economy, which has made painful and risky structural reforms a policy imperative, and widespread corruption within state institutions, which has inspired an increasingly high-profile crackdown on corrupt government officials, Beijing is grappling with a series of policy conundrums.
Second, China tried to test the extent of American commitment to freedom of navigation in international waters, in general, and its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, in particular. After all, the Obama administration has consistently fallen short of pledging unequivocal military support to the Philippines if a war were to erupt over disputed features within our EEZ. This ambiguity has encouraged China to constantly push the boundaries of its claims, anticipating Washington’s response and progressively questioning the Obama administration’s commitment to its regional allies.
There is also the element of diversion. Recent months have coincided with an uptick in domestic insurgency, especially the Uighur separatist movement in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang autonomous region. By all indications, the Chinese authorities are struggling to contain rising discontent among the Uighur minority population, who have resented cultural and political oppression, relentless inflow of Han Chinese to Muslim majority regions and economic marginalization. The insurgency and related terrorist activities have been spreading across the country.
As we confront an increasingly more assertive China, it is imperative that the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimant states step up cooperation and strategic engagement among themselves. At the same time, there should be a vigorous push for developing a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Japan has also assumed an increasingly pro-active role to counterbalance China, with Tokyo relaxing its guidelines on arms exports, increasing the Japanese Self Defense Forces’ military spending, and reinterpreting constitutional restrictions on external defense operations. Other Pacific powers such as Australia, South Korea and India are following suit.
Nonetheless, there is still room for diplomacy. China’s economy is still reliant on regional trade and the unimpeded transport of goods and basic commodities through international waters. And Beijing is highly sensitive about its international image. The ultimate objective is to create a broad coalition of likeminded countries to “constrain” China’s assertiveness, pressuring Beijing back to the negotiating table and establishing new maritime mechanisms that will stop the increasing militarization of the ongoing territorial disputes. Creative diplomacy and constant engagement will be crucial to preventing a destabilizing jostling in the South China Sea, an artery of global trade and a cornerstone of regional integration in recent decades.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a lecturer in the Political Science Department and an Opinion columnist for Huffington Post and Aljazeera English.
